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REVISITING THE INFLUENCE OF LAW 
CLERKS ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 
AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS* 
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CHRISTINA L. BOYD*** 
AMANDA C. BRYAN**** 
Do law clerks influence U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions in the 
Court’s agenda-setting stage?  For those Justices responding to their own 
law clerks’ cert recommendations, we expect a high degree of agreement 
between Justice and clerk.  For non-employing Justices, however, we 
anticipate that the likelihood of agreement between clerk and Justice will 
vary greatly based on the interplay among the ideological compatibility 
between a Justice and the clerk, the underlying certworthiness of the 
petition for review, and the clerk’s final recommendation.  Relying on a 
newly collected dataset of petitions making the Court’s discuss list over 
the 1986 through 1993 Terms, we find that Justices are more likely to 
follow a pool memo’s recommendation when it is consistent with the 
underlying cues present in the pool memo.  In addition, our results 
indicate that Justices are significantly more likely to follow grant 
recommendations when the recommendation is provided by a clerk from 
an ideologically proximate chambers as opposed to one that is distant.  
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These findings provide important information on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Court’s practice of pooling certiorari petitions among 
chambers and also suggest that political advisors, at the Supreme Court 
and in other institutions, are equipped to influence political elite decision 
making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do law clerks influence U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions?  
This question is of unquestionable import.  In a 2012 study published in 
American Politics Research, Black and Boyd examined this potential 
influence of law clerks on U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decision making 
in the Court’s agenda-setting stage.1  While their findings were strong—
indicating that law clerks serving in the Court’s certiorari (cert) pool 
have conditional influence on Justice cert voting—the analysis was 
based on limited data in terms of the number of observations and Court 
Terms analyzed.2 
Here, we return to this question with a much more expansive set of 
data, an exercise that permits us to examine the robustness of these 
earlier findings.  Consistent with this earlier work, we argue that the 
 
1.  Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147 (2012).  
2.  See id. at 156, 164. 
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influence of law clerks on Justices varies.  For those Justices responding 
to their own law clerks’ cert recommendations, we predict and find a 
strong relationship and a high degree of agreement between Justice and 
clerk.  However, for non-employing Justices, we expect and find that the 
likelihood of agreement between clerk and Justice will vary greatly 
based on the interplay among three factors: (1) the ideological 
compatibility between a Justice and the law clerk, (2) the underlying 
certworthiness of the petition seeking review, and (3) the clerk’s final 
recommendation to grant or deny review in a petition. 
Relying on a newly collected dataset of all paid, non-death penalty 
petitions making the Court’s discuss list over the course of eight Terms 
(1986–1993) and drawn from the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun,3 
the findings of our analysis are strong and robust.  By way of preview, 
we find that nearly 75% of all Justices’ agenda-setting votes in our data 
match the recommendation made by the cert pool memo author.  This 
influence is not uniform, but rather conditioned by two important 
factors: (1) Justices are significantly more likely to follow a pool memo’s 
recommendation when that recommendation is consistent with the 
underlying cues present in the pool memo; and (2) Justices are 
significantly more likely to follow grant recommendations when the 
recommendation is provided by a clerk from an ideologically proximate 
chambers as opposed to one that is distant. 
As we contend in this Article’s closing pages, these findings are 
informative on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Court’s practice of 
pooling certiorari petitions among the chambers.  More generally, the 
results, which we argue are generalizable across a variety of political 
institutions, also suggest advisors can and do systematically influence the 
decisions made by political elites.  Our efforts proceed in several steps.  
We begin by describing the advising role provided by clerks to their 
Justices.  We then turn to outlining our theories for the conditions under 
which Justices should be influenced by law clerks—both their own (Part 
III) and those of other Justices (Part IV).  Part V takes these general 
expectations and formulates them into specific empirically testable 
hypotheses.  Part VI describes our data, measures, and statistical results.  
Finally, Part VII concludes with a discussion of the findings, some 
 
3.  LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE DIGITAL ARCHIVE 
OF THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN (2007), http://epstein.wustl.edu/blackmu
n.php, archived at http://perma.cc/S5MQ-TPA9. 
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potential limitations, and what our results mean more generally for the 
Supreme Court as an institution. 
II. LAW CLERKS AS ADVISORS  
A. Advisors in Politics  
Since the 1920s, as the job of U.S. political elites has become more 
complex, the number of individuals serving in advisory roles across the 
branches has increased dramatically.  In 1919, each legislator in the U.S. 
Congress was authorized only two staff members, while current rules 
allow for over twenty staffers per legislator, plus access to numerous 
committee aides.4  Through 1918, U.S. Supreme Court Justices had 
congressional authorization to hire one stenographic clerk;5 today, the 
total staff size for an A ssociate Justice has more than tripled, including 
the addition of three more clerks.6  The President’s staff, which numbers 
near 2,000 today, was closer to 200 in the 1920s.7  If these numbers (and 
their increase) are any indication, advisors are anything but trivial 
members of federal politics. 
The accounts of advisor influence and the roles that advisors assume 
while serving in these national political institutions also seem to support 
this conclusion.  In Congress, advisors participate in policy development, 
conduct research, draft legislation, and communicate and negotiate on 
behalf of their member.8  In the White House, advisors develop policy 
expertise and act as information filters for the chief executive when it 
comes to their area of specialization.9  At the Supreme Court, the key 
advisor role to Justices is played by law clerks, who serve at the pleasure 
of their Justice and frequently take on a variety of tasks.10  For each of 
 
4.  ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, S. REP. NO. 103-215, at 
63 (1993). 
5.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 83 (2006). 
6.  Id. at 186. 
7.  LYN RAGSDALE, VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY: WASHINGTON TO 
CLINTON 257 tbl.6-1 (1996). 
8.  HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE 
INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 2 (1977). 
9.  See BRADLEY H. PATTERSON JR., THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE THE WEST 
WING AND BEYOND 3 (2000).  
10.  PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 14; ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ 
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3–4 
(2006). 
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these institutions, advisor numbers, knowledge of their responsibilities, 
and anecdotes from advisors themselves give us ample reason to believe 
that advisors play an important and influential role in our political 
system.  However, the extent of this influence and the conditions under 
which it is operational generally remain a mystery.11 
B. Law Clerks as Advisors at Certiorari  
Supreme Court Justices’ law clerks, just like other advisors, serve in 
a variety of capacities.  Although there is substantial variation in how 
Justices use their clerks, these advisors often conduct supplemental 
research, draft pre-oral argument bench memoranda that summarize the 
issues at stake in a case, and serve as the first—and perhaps only—line 
of review for certiorari petitions.12  This lattermost duty is our focus. 
Cert is “the process by which the [Supreme] Court [discretionarily] 
sets its agenda.”13  It begins with the losing party in the lower court 
arguing, via a written brief, why his case is worthy of further review.14  
 
11.  PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 2.  Much of this inattention in the existing literature to 
systematic methods and generalizable results can be blamed not on a lack of recognition of 
the role advisors play but rather on a lack of available data that can be used to assess 
influence.  The advising of legislators and presidents, for example, is often conducted through 
informal and undocumented conversations where debate and decision making can take place.  
Although these advisors author written position papers, which might then end up in archival 
materials, the existence of this level of detail on decisions is rare and varies widely across 
institutional setting.  See DANIEL E. PONDER, GOOD ADVICE: INFORMATION & POLICY 
MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 9 (2000); see also DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN 
CONGRESS: MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION 28 (1995).  That these 
generally unrecorded conversations are most likely to take place between a decision maker 
and her inner circle of advisors—the group most likely to exert influence—only compounds 
the difficulty of documenting meaningful influence.  In other cases, scholars turn to interviews 
with advisors and their principals.  In documenting the professional nature of congressional 
staffers, Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer A. Utter conducted in-depth interviews of forty 
current and former staffers.  Barbara S. Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressional 
Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerk?, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1251, 1276 app. (1997).  
Similar approaches have also been used for both the study of the President, PATTERSON, 
supra note 9, at 8, and the Supreme Court, PEPPERS, supra note 5; WARD & WEIDEN, supra 
note 10.  These detailed narratives often provide extensive insight into the complex roles 
advisors play, but fail to provide generalizable and systematic accounts of the influence of 
political advisors on the decision making of their political principals. 
12.  See PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 14 for a thorough review of clerk duties. 
13.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 21.  We only provide a brief description of the 
review process and how clerks are involved in it.  Much of this and all other procedural 
aspects of the Court’s business are explained in far greater detail in ROBERT L. STERN, 
EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE (8th ed. 2002). 
14.  STERN ET AL., supra note 13, at 288. 
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The cert petition and any accompanying materials are distributed to the 
Justices’ individual chambers for their review.15  In the past, the review 
process was a task each chambers engaged in individually, with these 
duties falling primarily upon a Justice’s clerks.16  However, as the 
number of petitions, particularly in forma pauperis (IFP) petitions (filed 
by indigent litigants), coming to the Court steadily rose through the 
1960s, many Justices began to worry about the amount of time their 
clerks spent focused on only one activity,17 and with good reason: 
Evidence indicates that during this era, many law clerks reviewed more 
than eleven cert petitions per week, amounting to upwards of two-thirds 
of their working time.18  
This situation led to the development of the Court’s cert pool in 
1972.19  The pool is a process whereby participating Justices combine 
(pool) their clerks’ labor in the review of cert petitions so as to divide 
the workload of summarizing the content and merit of each petition 
coming to the Court.20  The pool’s creation had an appreciable effect on 
clerk time.  As Ward and Weiden indicate, following the cert pool’s 
inception, the typical amount of workload a clerk spent on cert was 
reduced to four to five petitions per week,21 thereby accounting for 
about one-third of his or her time.22 
With the cert pool in place, each new cert petition is randomly 
assigned to one of the pool clerks, and that clerk is then responsible for 
 
15.  Id. 
16.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 45. 
17.  Id. at 38–39, 138–42. 
18.  Id. at 137–42. 
19.  Id. at 45. 
20.  The decision to participate in the cert pool is one made by each individual Justice.  
See id. at 147.  At the time of the pool’s creation in 1972, Justices William J. Brennan, William 
O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, and Potter Stewart did not participate.  Id. at 119.  Since 
then, only Justice John Paul Stevens, id. at 147, and Justice Samuel Alito have opted out of 
the pool, Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward, Introduction to IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 1, 7 (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus 
Ward eds., 2012).   
21.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 142.  
22.  This one-third time figure comes from the following evidence: “I would estimate 
that cert petitions took up roughly a third of our work time.  My guess is that this is more time 
than the average cert pool clerk spent on petitions, but only slightly more.”  Id. at 142 
(quoting Sean Donahue, Behind the Pillars of Justice: Remarks on Law Clerks, 3 LONG TERM 
VIEW 77, 79 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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producing a pool memorandum (pool memo) for that petition.23  
Written in a standardized way, each memo contains a summary of the 
case, the facts and proceedings below, and the parties’ arguments 
(including any briefs filed amicus curiae); the clerk’s discussion of the 
petition’s worthiness for review; and a recommendation regarding cert.24  
The pool memo is then distributed to all Justices in the cert pool.25  
Although the treatment of this memo varies by chambers, most Justices 
have their clerks engage in some level of markup.26  In Justice 
Blackmun’s chambers, for example, one of his clerks would review the 
pool memo and then provide his or her own recommendation as to 
whether the petition should be granted cert, along with anywhere from a 
sentence to several pages of commentary.27  Following this markup 
process, cert voting takes place at the Court’s weekly agenda-setting 
conference.28 
A number of compelling arguments make the cert stage a prime 
candidate for assessing clerk influence.  Perhaps chief among them is the 
fact that the clerks themselves suggest that cert is where they have the 
largest influence.29  In Ward and Weiden’s survey of former clerks, fully 
38% indicated that the cert decision was the most likely occasion where 
a clerk could change his Justice’s mind.30  By way of contrast, the same 
survey revealed that only 4% of clerks believed that the ultimate 
outcome of a case was the most likely area for influence.31  Additionally, 
the large volume of petitions for review, the fact that clerks make 
specific recommendations on cert, and the high degree of principal 
oversight in other activities on the Court (such as the opinion-writing 
process) suggest a comparatively high potential for clerk influence at the 
cert stage.  Ward and Weiden argue: 
 
23.  H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 42 (1991). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. 
26.  PEPPERS, supra note 5, at 210; PERRY, supra note 23, at 60. 
27.  For many petitions this was as simple as noting agreement with the reasoning and 
conclusion of the pool clerk.  In others, however, the Blackmun clerk would write a 
paragraph or more, at times simply adding to the pool memo writer’s logic while at others 
arguing for a wholly different substantive outcome (e.g., grant instead of deny). 
28.  PERRY, supra note 23, at 43–44. 
29.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 240. 
30.  Id. at 145 fig.3. 
31.  Id.  
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Because clerks make formal recommendations on cert memos, it 
is often thought that clerks have influence over cert decisions.  
Indeed, not only do clerks make formal recommendations on 
their cert memos, i.e., “GRANT” or “DENY,” but they also often 
try to persuade in the body of the memo with political as well as 
legal analyses.  For example, when asked whether he often 
attempted to convince his justice of his position on a case or 
issue, a Douglas clerk from the 1960s said that he did not, 
“except in cert memos.”  Indeed, one way of viewing the cert 
memo, and the mark-up memo in the case of pool memos, is that 
the clerk is attempting to persuade the justices to either take the 
case or not.32 
Finally, unlike the other tasks that clerks may work on for their 
Justices, we know that clerks serving in the cert pool have a role in the 
cert process for every case that comes before the Court—regardless of 
which Justice they work for.33  This consistency in job assignment makes 
cert, and more generally, clerks, an ideal arena for examining advisor 
influence in political decision making. 
III. POLITICAL ELITES AS PRINCIPALS, ADVISORS AS AGENTS 
To most, political advisor influence, even though it may not be 
modeled, is assumed to exist.34  Given the enormous amount of 
responsibilities that major political actors face, it is no wonder that they 
turn to advisors to gather information, develop expertise, and, in certain 
contexts, act on their behalves.  This assumption of advisor influence, 
then, is both reasonable and consistent with the delegation aspect of 
principal–agency theory.35  As Kowert tells us, “It may be lonely at the 
top, but hardly ever so lonely that important decisions in government 
and business are made by only one person.”36  From a variety of 
anecdotes, we know that advisors play an important role in making 
highly important decisions across a variety of political institutions.  
White House advisors craft future national foreign policy, congressional 
 
32.  Id. at 144. 
33.  PERRY, supra note 23, at 42. 
34.  See WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 35; see also JEAN A. GARRISON, GAMES 
ADVISORS PLAY: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS, at 
xviii–xix (1999). 
35.  See Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal–Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 203, 220–21 (2005). 
36.  PAUL A. KOWERT, GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK: WHEN DO LEADERS LEARN 
FROM THEIR ADVISORS?, at 1 (2002). 
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aides strike bargains over the text of a pending bill, and Supreme Court 
clerks write initial drafts of controversial opinions. 
While political principals are ultimately responsible for the decisions 
that they make, they are unable to make those decisions alone.  Simply 
put, political actors “are most troubled by insufficient time and 
information.”37  Enter the political advisor, whose existence and 
substantial duties can be explained by sheer necessity.  By acting as the 
silent agent to presidents, legislators, and judges, advisors can specialize, 
gain expertise, and provide information to their principals that will 
enable multi-dimensional decision making that would not otherwise be 
possible.  Within this scenario, political principals can be likened to 
managers of an enterprise.38  
Of course, principal–agency theory demands that agents be properly 
incentivized in order to be effective and not shirk.39  In the case of 
advisors, both short-term and long-term reputation and career 
considerations present a sizable incentive structure that helps prevent 
shirking.40  In the short term, advisors may have vast discretion in doing 
their jobs, but “such grants of discretion can always be recalled on a 
moment’s notice, even retroactively.”41  Longer term, many of these 
advisors have career goals that will keep them active in political- and 
policy-related activities.42 
With an effective principal–agent relationship in place, politicians 
serving as enterprise managers can then delegate substantial activities to 
their staffers, something that is necessary for modern-day political 
success.  Because actors in the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
Branches are not equipped to manage every minute detail of their 
position or to personally acquire the information necessary to make the 
most of the administrative and policy-making decisions required of 
 
37.  H. Owen Porter, Legislative Information Needs and Staff Resources in the American 
States, in LEGISLATIVE STAFFING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 39, 40 (James J. Heaphey 
& Alan P. Balutis eds., 1975). 
38.  Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the 
Ties-That-Bind, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 381, 382 (1981). 
39.  Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); 
Miller, supra note 35, at 204; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and 
Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). 
40.  See Romzek & Utter, supra note 11, at 1260, 1263. 
41.  Id. at 1260.  
42.  Id. 
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them, political principals delegate a variety of tasks to advisors,43 some 
of which are routine and others that approach policy making.44  Advisors 
are frequently considered area experts by their bosses, a structure that, 
when served by incentivized agents in a well-designed system, provides 
an effective method of controlling the “chaotic informational 
environment”45 through filtering and delivering information to 
principals.  The same system also increases the possibilities for advisors 
to serve in critical and important roles in politics.  Thus, the very design 
of this advisory system explains not only the existence of a sizable 
contingent of advisors and staff surrounding modern political decision 
makers but also the presence of vast potential for advisors to influence 
governmental policy. 
In the context of law clerks as advisors to Justices, in hiring a law 
clerk to work for her, a Justice is entrusting the clerk to work on her 
behalf and provide assistance as she works to pursue her goals.  More 
generally, this includes a Justice’s desire “to see [her] policy preferences 
etched into law.”46  What is more, from a theoretical perspective, we 
have several reasons to believe that a Justice is equipped to ensure 
dutiful and loyal work among her own law clerks.  These reasons include 
the Justice’s control over the selection of law clerks, her ability to audit 
law clerk decisions and activities, and her ability to incentivize loyalty 
through influence on post-clerkship employment opportunities. 
Turning first to a Justice’s selection of her law clerks, each Justice 
has complete discretion with regards to the process used to select clerks 
and the outcome of that process—i.e., who ultimately gets selected.47  
This creates the ability for a Justice, alone and through her existing staff 
of advisors, to develop a detailed understanding of the applicants, their 
 
43.  See, e.g., Andrew Rudalevige, The Structure of Leadership: Presidents, Hierarchies, 
and Information Flow, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 333, 338 (2005).  
44.  Id. at 338, 344.  We are not the first to suggest using a principal–agency approach to 
understanding law clerks.  Sally J. Kenney has deployed such a perspective in her work on 
clerks at the Court and on reférendaires, the law clerk counterpart in the European Court of 
Justice.  Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by 
Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593 (2000); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents? 
What Lazarus’s Closed Chambers Adds to Our Understanding of Law Clerks at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185 (2000) (reviewing EDWARD LAZARUS, 
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE 
THE SUPREME COURT (1998)). 
45.  Rudalevige, supra note 43, at 335. 
46.  LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–10 (1998). 
47.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 108. 
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personalities and talents, and to select only those individuals who she 
can trust will pursue her agenda and policy goals.48  Information such as 
law school attended, grades and course work, letters of 
recommendation, group membership, writing samples, and lower court 
clerkships can be critical for the reliability of the results of this selection 
process.49 
Upon hiring a law clerk, a Justice can monitor her work by 
auditing.50  Whether the clerk reviews cert petitions, writes bench 
memoranda, or authors early drafts of opinions, the employing Justice 
still has access to the raw materials from which the clerk drew.51  Beyond 
this, incentives for clerks to impress their employing Justice are high.  
Faithful, reliable clerks are likely to receive strong post-clerkship 
employment support.52  Supreme Court clerkships are tremendous 
accomplishments for attorneys, carrying with them great potential for 
hiring bonuses, high salaries, prestige, and opportunities.53  Being held in 
low regard by one’s former Justice would surely decrease these post-
clerkship opportunities and benefits. 
These tools of selection and control give us good reason to believe 
that the clerk–Justice employment relationship is a strong one that fits 
well within the principal–agency theoretical framework.  Because of the 
strength of this relationship, we expect that there will be great similarity 
between what a Justice would have done herself and what her clerk does 
as her agent.  And due to this, in the context of cert, we expect that 
Justices will closely follow the recommendations of their own clerks. 
IV. SIGNALING THEORY:  
LAW CLERK INFLUENCE IN NON-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 
A Supreme Court clerk’s interactions, work, and potential for 
influence are generally limited to her employing Justice.  However, the 
existence of the cert pool facilitates unique interactions between clerks 
and non-employing Justices because a law clerk’s pool memo and 
 
48.  See id. at 107. 
49.  Id. at 55–56; Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and 
Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869, 870–71 (2001); Todd C. Peppers & 
Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical 
Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 55 (2008). 
50.  Peppers & Ward, supra note 20, at 9. 
51.  See id. 
52.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 1. 
53.  Id. at 1, 55. 
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recommendation are distributed to and relied upon by chambers other 
than that of her own Justice.54  While all pool Justices receive the same 
memo, only the Justice who originally hired the law clerk has the ability 
to use the direct supervision tools described above.  For example, 
Justice O’Connor had no influence in selecting or overseeing the clerks 
hired by Justice Thomas.  As a result, we must look beyond principal–
agency theory to what is known as signaling theory55 to offer predictions 
on how non-employing Justices will respond to cert pool 
recommendations.56  Signaling theory permits the exploration of a 
communication between a sender and a receiver in which the sender 
holds an informational advantage over the receiver.  Under the theory, 
as the interests of the sender and receiver move further apart, the value 
of the communication (i.e., the signal) decreases.57 
In our context, the signaling model depends on the communication 
of information through the pool memo from a sender (here, the pool 
clerk) to the receiver (here, each Justice serving in the pool).  As with 
the agent in principal–agency theory, the clerk in signaling theory has a 
significant informational advantage over the receiving Justices.  During 
the cert pool process, the pool clerk reads the complete record of a case, 
including the litigants’ briefs and any lower court opinions, all of which 
inform the content of his resulting pool memos and the signal that is 
sent with it.58  Since the interests and loyalty of the signal-sending pool 
clerk and the signal-receiving pool Justice do not always align, the 
reliability of the communication through this signaling process is not 
always of high value. 
As such, after the Justices in the pool receive the cert 
recommendation, they must account for the potential that the pool 
 
54.  PERRY, supra note 23, at 42. 
55.  Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information Transmission, 50 
ECONOMETRICA 1431, 1432–33 (1982). 
56.  In recent years, signaling theory has been used to understand other Supreme Court-
related relationships, including the interactions between Justices and the Solicitor General, 
Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth Justice: The 
Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
72 (2005), and the Supreme Court’s overall decision to grant or deny cert, Ryan C. Black & 
Ryan J. Owens, Consider the Source (and the Message): Supreme Court Justices and Strategic 
Audits of Lower Court Decisions, 65 POL. RES. Q. 385 (2012); Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey 
A. Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational 
Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101 (2000). 
57  Crawford & Sobel, supra note 55, at 1431–33. 
58.  STERN ET AL., supra note 13, at 39. 
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memo’s recommendation made by the law clerk might be wrong or 
incomplete.  Such signaling “errors” might be related to the clerk’s skill 
at interpreting the private information or could be deliberate efforts to 
influence the receiver.  Because examining the record directly himself to 
check the quality and accuracy of the pool recommendation in every 
case would be prohibitively time-consuming, a Justice must turn to 
informational shortcuts to accomplish this assessment. 
In this process, we believe that Justices rely on a handful of readily 
available sources in making this determination: (1) the presence of 
critical informational cues about the underlying quality of a cert 
petition; (2) the direction of the clerk’s pool recommendation (grant, 
deny); and (3) the compatibility of the political preferences between a 
receiving Justice and the pool clerk.  In addition to the information 
available to a Justice to assess pool recommendation reliability, we also 
expect that his need to rely on the recommendations of the cert pool will 
vary based on the length of his tenure on the Court. 
Key elements of a case being petitioned to the Court for cert can 
serve as important informational cues that influence Justices’ cert 
voting.59  This critical information includes things such as whether the 
petition involves a circuit conflict or an important national matter, 
whether there was a dissenting opinion in the lower court, or whether 
there is an IFP petitioner in the case.60  Petitions with many positive cues 
should be better cert candidates for Justices (i.e., more certworthy) than 
those with fewer positive cues or more negative cues.61 
These informational cues are likely to operate in connection with the 
pool clerk’s grant/deny recommendation for each petition.  Simply put, 
we expect that Justices will be more likely to follow clerk 
recommendations when they align with the signal sent through the 
petition’s level of certworthiness.  If a petition is considered certworthy 
and the clerk recommends granting it, then this recommendation should 
be more likely to be followed than if the law clerk recommends denying 
the same high quality petition.  The opposite (higher likelihood of 
following deny recommendations for non-certworthy petitions) should 
hold as well.  This means, for example, that a Justice would be more 
likely to follow a grant recommendation for the petition with conflict 
 
59.  Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin & Daniel Rosen, The 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111, 
118 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). 
60.  Id. at 115–17. 
61.  Id. at 118. 
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and a deny recommendation for the petition submitted by an indigent. 
As we argue above, individual law clerks should behave according to 
the preferences of their employing Justices.  This ideologically driven 
behavior will be consistent with the preferences of some outside 
chambers, but it is likely to be far from the preferences of others.  
Indeed, when the ideological distance between a Justice and the 
chambers of the pool clerk’s Justice is high, the quality of the cert pool 
signal will be doubted, and the receiving Justice should be less likely to 
follow that recommendation.  Our theory thus predicts that Justice 
Scalia would, all else equal, reject a recommendation from one of 
Justice Ginsburg’s law clerks while accepting a recommendation from 
one of Justice Thomas’s law clerks. 
To further complicate matters, we expect that, because Justices are 
forward looking and policy conscious in the cert votes,62 the above-
noted importance of ideological distance and the relationship between a 
petition’s certworthiness and the type of recommendation that a pool 
clerk makes will themselves be interrelated.  When faced with a petition 
that (1) is of high quality (i.e., is certworthy) and (2) has received a grant 
recommendation from the pool clerk, a Justice should be more likely to 
follow that recommendation when the policy preferences of the pool 
clerk are similar to the voting Justice’s own preferences.  Applying this 
expectation once again to sitting Justices in our data, even if the petition 
is of high quality and the pool clerk recommends granting review, 
Justice Scalia would still potentially discount a recommendation coming 
from a pool clerk hailing from Justice Marshall’s ideologically distant 
chambers. 
Beyond these relationships, we also expect that a Justice’s 
propensity to follow a clerk’s recommendation will be driven, in part, by 
his level of experience and familiarity with the Court.  Consistent with 
previous research on the Court indicating that a Justice’s behavior varies 
across his Supreme Court tenure,63 this cert-related expectation 
recognizes that newly appointed Justices need time to become 
 
62.  Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The 
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1063 (2009); Gregory A. Caldeira, John 
R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme 
Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 550 (1999). 
63.  Timothy M. Hagle, “Freshman Effects” for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 1142 (1993); Mark S. Hurwitz & Joseph V. Stefko, Acclimation and Attitudes: 
“Newcomer” Justices and Precedent Conformance on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 121 
(2004). 
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accustomed to the Court’s unique workload, norms, culture, and 
responsibilities.  In the context of cert, relatively new Justices are likely 
to lean more heavily on cert pool recommendations than their senior 
colleagues in deciding how to vote in the Court’s agenda-setting stage. 
V. HYPOTHESES 
The above detailed theories give rise to the following four 
hypotheses64: 
 • Hypothesis 1: Pool clerk recommendations to deny non-
certworthy petitions should be more likely to be followed than 
grant recommendations of similarly non-certworthy petitions. 
 • Hypothesis 2: Pool clerk recommendations to grant certworthy 
petitions should be more likely to be followed than deny 
recommendations of similarly certworthy petitions. 
 • Hypothesis 3: Pool clerk recommendations to grant certworthy 
petitions should be more likely to be followed by Justices 
ideologically similar to the recommending pool clerk. 
 • Hypothesis 4: The less time a Justice has served on the Court, the 
more likely he should be to follow a pool clerk’s cert 
recommendation. 
VI. DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
To further probe the nature of clerk influence at cert in this 
replication project, we analyzed a subset of the petitions considered by 
the Court.  We started by examining the conference discuss lists for the 
Court’s 1986–1993 Terms, which we obtained from the archival papers 
of Justice Blackmun at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.  
The discuss list identifies what petitions received a recorded vote at the 
agenda-setting stage.  Although the Chief Justice is responsible for 
circulating the first draft of the discuss list, any Justice can ask to have a 
petition added to it.65  Petitions not making the discuss list are denied 
 
64.  These hypotheses align closely with hypotheses 1a–1c and 2 in the 2012 paper that 
we are replicating.  Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 155–56.  As we discuss in further detail 
below, we do not have the data necessary in this project to model the procedural complexity 
hypothesis from the 2012 paper.  See infra note 79. 
65.  Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, Selecting the Select Few: The Discuss List and 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1124, 1126 (2013).   
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without a formal vote.66 
Discuss lists in hand, we then made several data-winnowing steps.  
First, we removed all petitions seeking review of a death penalty 
sentence.67  Second, we included only paid petitions.68  Third, we 
included only petitions coming from a federal court of appeals or federal 
district court.69  All told, the data used for our analysis consist of 9,531 
Justice votes cast across 1,081 petitions.  By way of comparison, the 
original Black and Boyd 2012 study examined 305 petitions containing 
just over 2,000 Justice votes.70 
Our dependent variable is whether there is agreement between the 
law clerk’s pool memo recommendation on cert and the final cert vote 
cast by a Justice serving in the cert pool.  A dichotomous measure, this 
variable is coded as 1 when a law clerk recommends grant and the 
voting Justice votes to grant or when a law clerk recommends deny and 
the voting Justice votes to deny.71  In other scenarios (e.g., clerk 
 
66.  Id.  The process by which petitions are selected for the discuss list is not, of course, 
random.  See id.  Rather it is the Court’s first chance to winnow the pool of cases to a more 
manageable number by eliminating those that are clearly without merit.  See id.  One might 
be concerned that, by selecting only petitions that have already cleared this bar, our analysis 
will have some degree of a selection bias.  While there is undoubtedly some bias, we believe it 
actually causes us to understate the true nature of law clerk influence.  
67.  During most of the Terms analyzed, the Court had a distinct cert review process for 
capital cases which automatically added them to the discuss list.  See EDWARD LAZARUS, 
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 
119–22 (Penguin Books 2005) (1998).  When the Court voted on whether to grant cert in 
these petitions, it was the standing policy of Justices Marshall and Brennan to vote to grant 
the petition, vacate the death penalty sentence, and remand the case for further proceedings.  
LAZARUS, supra, at 159; see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 205–08 (1979). 
68.  This is consistent with the vast majority of agenda-setting studies, which argue that 
unpaid (i.e., in forma pauperis) petitions are of substantially less merit than their paid 
counterparts.  See, e.g., Black & Owens, supra note 62, at 1065 n.4; Gregory A. Caldeira & 
John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1116 (1988).  But see Ryan C. Black & Christina L. Boyd, U.S. Supreme 
Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 286, 288 n.2 
(2012). 
69.  The data we use here were collected as part of a larger project on the policy 
influences on agenda setting.  This separate project requires that we place lower court judges 
and Supreme Court Justices in the same ideological space.  The Judicial Common Space 
allows us to compare preferences of Justices and lower court judges.  Lee Epstein, Andrew D. 
Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 303, 305–06 (2007).  At present, however, no analogous procedure exists for state court 
judges.  This data loss is not, however, especially worrisome since nearly three-fourths of all 
petitions come from the lower federal courts.  
70.  Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 156.  
71.  We follow Harold J. Spaeth and code a Justice’s vote as “grant” when she actually 
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recommends granting review and a Justice votes to deny), this variable 
is coded as 0.  Obtained from Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth,72 these clerk 
recommendations and Justice votes were coded from the pool memos 
and Justice Blackmun’s docket sheets, respectively, which existing 
research has shown to be a reliable and valid indicator of the Justices’ 
agenda-setting behavior.73 
To test our four hypotheses, we need independent variables to 
capture the direction of the clerk’s recommendation, a petition’s 
certworthiness, the ideological distance between the recommending 
clerk and the voting Justice, and the length of the voting Justice’s tenure 
on the Court.  To isolate whether the impact of a clerk’s 
recommendation only matters in, for example, petitions of high 
certworthiness, we further interact the first three of these variables 
together (i.e., direction, certworthiness, and ideological distance).  We 
describe each of these measures in turn. 
Clerk Recommendation takes on a value of 1 when the pool memo 
recommends grant and 0 when the memo recommends deny.  The pool 
clerk recommended denying in approximately 70% of our petitions and 
granting in the remaining 30%.74 
To operationalize Certworthiness, we follow the practice from our 
2012 piece and develop a summary measure that captures the 
meaningful informational cues found by scores of scholars of the Court’s 
cert process over the years.75  To do this, we first estimate a logistic 
 
voted to grant and also when she voted to “Join-3,” something that becomes a grant vote if 
there are three other grant votes.  HAROLD J. SPAETH, EXPANDED BURGER COURT 
JUDICIAL DATABASE (1969–1985), at v (2008), available at 
http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/burger_codebook.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/BDX8-HYPQ.  Our results remain the same if we recode Join-3 votes as 
missing data. 
72.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3. 
73.  Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Analyzing the Reliability of Supreme Court 
Justices’ Agenda-Setting Records, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 254 (2009). 
74.  Note that we “coarsen” the specific language of a pool clerk’s recommendation to 
make this value dichotomous.  That is, although when making a recommendation the most 
common language is to simply say “Deny” (or “Grant”), the pool clerk will, on occasion, 
hedge her recommendation by saying “Close, but deny” or “Weak grant.”  We pool the 
close/weak recommendations with their “strong” counterparts. 
75.  Tanenhaus, et al., supra note 59, at 118; see also Jennifer Barnes Bowie & Donald R. 
Songer, Assessing the Applicability of Strategic Theory to Explain Decision Making on the 
Courts of Appeals, 62 POL. RES. Q. 393, 393 (2009); Caldeira et al., supra note 62, at 570; 
Caldeira & Wright, supra note 68, at 1109, 1116; S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze & Louise 
Kirklosky, The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 642 (1972). 
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regression model at the petition level that includes variables that tap into 
legal conflict, the United States’ position, lower court decision 
characteristics, and petition characteristics.76  We then calculate 
predicted probabilities for each of these petitions and use those values 
in our variable.  The variable has an observed range of 0.07 through 
1.00, with a mean of 0.17 and a standard deviation of 0.29. 
Ideological Distance is coded as the absolute value of the difference 
between a voting Justice’s Judicial Common Space score77 and the score 
of the pool writer’s parent Justice for the Term.78  Thus, when measuring 
the distance between a Justice and his own clerk, this variable takes on a 
value of 0. 
Justice Tenure is measured as the number of years that a Justice had 
been on the bench before casting her agenda-setting vote in the case at 
hand.79 
Finally, we also include Justice fixed effects.  These consist of a 
single dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 for each of the 
Justices in our data.  Fixed effects allow us to determine, for example, if 
Justice Thomas was simply more likely, even after controlling for all 
other variables in our model, to follow recommendations from the pool 
memo than say Justice Ginsburg.80 
A. Methods and Results 
Our dependent variable—whether we observe agreement between 
the pool clerk’s recommendation and a Justice’s final agenda-setting 
 
76.  The results from this logistic regression are reported in the Appendix, infra. 
77.  See Epstein et al., supra note 69, at 305–06. 
78.  This represents a minor departure from the original 2012 American Politics 
Research paper, where we use a Justice’s Martin-Quinn score.  See Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).  See supra note 69 for additional 
discussion about why we are using Judicial Common Space scores in this present project.  In 
any event, the bivariate correlation between the two measures is above 0.95 (p < 0.001), which 
means the two measures are nearly identical. 
79.  Due to data limitations, this study omits one variable and its related hypothesis that 
was present in the 2012 study.  The omitted variable, Procedural Complexity, was 
“operationalize[d] as the proportion of pages in a cert pool memo that were devoted to 
discussing the facts of the case and proceedings of the lower court(s).”  Black & Boyd, supra 
note 1, at 157.  The hypothesis related to this variable was designed to capture complex 
underlying cases that would likely lead to Justices being increasingly likely to turn to a case’s 
underlying material themselves rather than relying on a clerk’s recommendation.  Id.  In the 
2012 study, Black and Boyd found no statistical support for this expectation.  Id. at 164. 
80.  The original 2012 study did not, due to a limited number of observations, include 
these controls.  See Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 156–57. 
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vote—is dichotomous, so we estimate a logistic regression model.  To 
allay potential concerns about a lack of independence across our 
observations, we calculate and assess statistical significance using robust 
standard errors.  Because our model includes multiple interaction terms, 
the normal table of parameter estimates is essentially useless in 
informing us about the relationships among our variables.81  Thus, we 
move directly to using stochastic simulations to illustrate our results.82  
We begin with Figure 1, which shows the results for Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 1 argued that Justices should be more 
likely to follow recommendations to deny as opposed to grant when the 
petition is of low certworthiness.83  Similarly, Hypothesis 2 argued that 
Justices should be more likely to follow recommendations of grant as 
opposed to deny when the petition has a high level of facial 
certworthiness.84  We find strong support for both of these hypotheses. 
Figure 1 is divided into two panels.  The left panel corresponds to a 
petition with a low level of certworthiness, which we define as being the 
tenth percentile value in our sample data or roughly a 10% baseline 
chance of being granted review.  Within the plot, the square point 
denotes the estimated probability that a Justice follows the pool clerk’s 
recommendation when that recommendation is to deny the petition.  
The circle point shows that analogous probability if the law clerk were 
to recommend granting review in the petition.  Consistent with our 
expectation, we find that a Justice is more than twice as likely to follow 
a law clerk’s recommendation to deny than she is to follow a 
recommendation to grant.  The predicted probability of agreement for a 
low certworthy petition accompanied by a deny recommendation is 0.86, 
compared to a probability of only 0.37 when that same petition is 
accompanied by a grant recommendation.  
 
81.  See generally Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and 
Probit Models, 80 ECON. LETTERS 123 (2003); William D. Berry, Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt 
& Justin Esarey, Testing for Interaction in Binary Logit and Probit Models: Is a Product Term 
Essential?, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 248 (2010); Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & Matt 
Golder, Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 
63 (2006); Tsung-han Tsai & Jeff Gill, Interactions in Generalized Linear Models: Theoretical 
Issues and an Application to Personal Vote-Earning Attributes, 2 SOC. SCI. 91 (2013). 
82.  See infra Appendix for a table of parameter estimates that underlie these 
simulations. 
83.  See supra Part V. 
84.  See supra Part V. 
 94 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:75 
 
 
Figure 1 
Effect of Certworthiness and Clerk  
Recommendation on Likelihood of Agreement 
 
 
Note: Low and high certworthiness correspond to petitions with a 0.10 and a 0.80 
probability of being granted review, which are the tenth and ninetieth percentile 
values in our data, respectively.  The square mark shows the point estimate and the 
vertical whisker denotes the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed).  All other 
variables were held at their mean or median values, as appropriate. 
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The right panel increases the level of certworthiness for the petition 
being reviewed.  In particular, we now use the ninetieth percentile value 
in our data, which corresponds to roughly a 0.84 probability of seeing 
the Court grant review in the petition.  The square point again denotes 
the likelihood of agreement when the clerk recommends denying the 
petition and the circle point shows the likelihood of agreement when the 
clerk recommends granting it.  In such a petition, we estimate a 0.48 
probability of agreement if a clerk were to recommend denying it 
compared with a 0.75 probability of agreement if the clerk were to 
suggest granting the petition—a relative change of more than 55%. 
Both of these empirical results are consistent with our expectations.  
Although law clerks have an informational advantage when it comes to 
knowing the quality of a petition, the cert pool format compels them to 
disclose a substantial portion of that information, which the Justices are 
able to observe.  Thus, recommendations that are consistent with the 
underlying cues in a petition are more likely to be followed than those 
that seem incongruous with the petition’s quality. 
We next consider our third hypothesis.  Here, we argued that when 
considering a pool clerk recommendation to grant review, a Justice 
would be more likely to follow that recommendation when it came from 
a pool clerk whose chambers was ideologically proximate to (as opposed 
to distant from) the Justice.85  More concretely, Justice Thomas should 
view a grant recommendation from one of Justice Scalia’s law clerks 
more favorably than the same recommendation from one of Justice 
Ginsburg’s clerks. 
Figure 2 shows the results we obtain for this hypothesis.  Along the 
x-axis we show the certworthiness of a petition, which ranges from very 
low on the far left (i.e., 0.10) to very high on the far right (i.e., 1.0).  The 
y-axis shows what we might think of as the “home chambers advantage.”  
This is the difference in the probability of a Justice following a clerk’s 
recommendation when the clerk is from her own chambers (and 
ideological distance is equal to zero) versus when the clerk is from a 
chambers that is ideologically distant (we use the distance between 
Justice Thomas and Justice Blackmun).  Positive values, therefore, 
indicate that a Justice is more likely to follow her own clerk’s 
recommendation as opposed to the recommendation from a more 
distant chambers.  
 
85.  See supra Part V. 
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Figure 2 
Effect of Ideological Agreement and Clerk  
Recommendation on Likelihood of Agreement 
 
Note: The solid horizontal lines show the point estimate and the vertical whiskers 
denote the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed).  All other variables were held at 
their mean or median values, as appropriate. 
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 Within the plot itself we show two lines.  The top line denotes the 
home chambers advantage when the clerk recommends granting review.  
The bottom line, by contrast, shows the difference when the clerk 
recommends denying the petition.  Both of these lines are accompanied 
by a series of vertical line segments, which express our uncertainty 
around the point estimate.  When these segments cross the dashed 
horizontal line located at zero, then we can say that no significant home 
chambers advantage exists.  Conversely, if the lines do not cross that 
dashed zero line, then we can be confident a systematic effect exists. 
Starting with the top line, which corresponds to a recommendation 
of grant, we see a consistent and substantial home chambers advantage 
across all values of petition certworthiness.  Take, for example, a 
petition with a coin-flip likelihood of being granted review.  Under the 
circumstance, we estimate that a grant recommendation coming from a 
Justice’s own clerk will have a 40% higher chance of being followed 
than if that same recommendation were to come from an ideologically 
distant chambers.86  Importantly, we find that this difference persists 
even in instances when a petition is either very unlikely to be granted 
review (i.e., low certworthiness) or very likely to be granted review (i.e., 
high certworthiness).  Indeed, the effect size never becomes smaller than 
a 0.31 agreement advantage afforded to a Justice’s own clerk. 
Although we find a substantial and persistent effect for grant 
recommendations, as the bottom line of the figure indicates, we do not 
find such an effect for deny recommendations.  A Justice is slightly more 
likely to follow her own clerk’s deny recommendation when a petition is 
of very low certworthiness (a probability difference of about 0.04).  This 
small effect quickly becomes statistically insignificant, however, as we 
move up to higher levels of certworthiness.  Indeed, the point estimate 
for very high values of certworthiness actually becomes negative, which 
would suggest that a Justice is more likely to follow an ideologically 
distant clerk’s recommendation over her own clerk’s.87 
 
86.  The specific agreement probabilities are 0.72 (own clerk) versus 0.32 (ideologically 
distant clerk). 
87.  We are unable to push this point too far, however, given the large width of our 
confidence intervals.  The difference is still statistically insignificant at the 0.10 level but 
would be statistically significant at the 0.20 level (all two-tailed tests), which has been used by 
some as the threshold for accepting the null hypothesis.  See Timothy R. Johnson, James F. 
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 349, 364 tbl.3 (2005). 
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Finally, although we fail to find support for our judicial tenure 
hypothesis,88 we do recover some significant differences for our Justice 
fixed effects.  That is, even after controlling for the factors in our model, 
we find that some variation in whether a Justice follows a law clerk’s 
recommendation can be attributed to the specific identity of the Justice 
him or herself.89  Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of these Justice-level 
differences.  Along the x-axis we show the likelihood of a Justice 
following a law clerk’s recommendation in an average cert petition, 
which we operationalize as one with a 0.42 probability of being granted 
review where the clerk recommends denial.  Ideological distance is held 
at its mean value.  The y-axis shows each of the thirteen Justices in our 
data.  The square points denote the likelihood a Justice follows the 
clerk’s recommendation and the horizontal whiskers express our (often 
considerable) uncertainty around the point estimates. 
Upon initial examination, it appears as though Justice Ginsburg is 
the most likely to follow recommendations from the pool memo.  As the 
width of the horizontal whisker indicates, however, there is a substantial 
amount of uncertainty around that estimate.  This stems from the fact 
that we have only twenty-one observations for Justice Ginsburg in our 
data.  Although she ended up following the pool writer’s 
recommendation in eighteen of those observations (about 86%), we can 
only say that the rate at which she followed clerk recommendations is 
significantly larger than the rate of her predecessor, Justice White, who 
followed around 63% of cert pool recommendations.90  
 
88.  See supra Part V; infra Appendix Table 2. 
89.  We made this determination by comparing the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) values for a simple model that did not include Justice fixed effects versus the more 
complicated model that did include them.  The BIC for the more complicated model was 
9,875 compared to a BIC of 9,891 for the simple model.  This difference (of 16) provides 
“very strong” evidence to prefer the fixed effects model over the pooled one.  See J. SCOTT 
LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES USING STATA 113 (2d ed. 2006). 
90.  See the caption, supra Figure 3, for a complete listing of all other significant 
differences. 
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Figure 3 
Effect of Justice Identity on Likelihood of Agreement 
Note: The square mark shows the point estimate and the horizontal whisker denotes 
the 95% simulation interval (two-tailed).  The petition characteristics were held 
constant at 0.42 certworthiness, deny recommendation, and an average amount of 
ideological distance.  The 22 significant Justice differences (out of 78 possible, p < 
0.05, two-tailed test) are: Blackmun > Stevens, Blackmun > White, Brennan > 
White, Ginsburg > White, Kennedy > Rehnquist, Kennedy > Stevens, Kennedy > 
White, Marshall > Stevens, Marshall > White, O’Connor > Stevens, O’Connor > 
White, Powell > Stevens, Powell > White, Scalia > Rehnquist, Souter > Rehnquist, 
Thomas > Rehnquist, Scalia > Stevens, Scalia > White, Souter > Stevens, Souter > 
White, Thomas > Stevens, Thomas > White. 
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Readers familiar with the cert pool might be curious to see the 
presence of three Justices in Figure 3.  In particular, we have estimates 
for the probability that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens would 
follow a pool clerk’s recommendation.  Such estimates might be 
puzzling given that none of these Justices participated in the cert pool 
during their time on the Court.91  Why, then, do we include them in our 
analysis?  Although non-participating Justices do not receive their own 
copies of the cert pool memos,92 it is likely that their law clerks are, 
through the law clerk network,93 aware of what the pool memo has 
recommended in most petitions—especially those that are on the 
discuss list and are thus viable candidates for receiving a cert grant.  
Indeed, Perry, in his seminal book on agenda setting, is told by his 
informants that non-pool clerks would “go swimming” in cert pool 
memos to look for guidance in making recommendations for their own, 
non-pool Justice.94 
From our perspective, then, the question of whether the cert pool 
influenced a non-pool Justice is both empirical and one that, to the best 
of our knowledge, no published research has examined.  If the extent of 
“pool swimming” by non-pool clerks was limited, then we should expect 
to find non-pool Justices as being among the least likely to follow a pool 
clerk’s recommendation.  If, by contrast, it was more widespread, then 
non-pool Justices should be statistically similar to the pool Justices.  Our 
results suggest the answer is somewhere between these two extremes.  
Justice Stevens, for example, has the second lowest probability of 
following a clerk’s recommendation.95  His other non-pool colleagues, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, fall more towards the middle of the 
pack.96  As we note in the caption to Figure 3, although we can conclude 
that a significant difference exists between Justices Marshall and 
Stevens, we cannot conclude that such a difference exists between either 
Justices Brennan and Marshall or Justices Stevens and Brennan. 
 
91.  PERRY, supra note 23, at 42. 
92.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 45. 
93.  Id. at 164–65. 
94.  PERRY, supra note 23, at 54 (quoting Interview with C2, Unidentified Law Clerk). 
95.  See infra Appendix Table 2. 
96.  See infra Appendix Table 2. 
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VII. DISCUSSION 
A. Placing the Results in Context 
Previous research on the Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process, 
though not ignoring law clerks, has often failed to systematically 
incorporate their role into models of judicial behavior.  As we have 
argued in the past, this omission provides an incomplete picture of the 
Court’s discretionary decision making in this important stage.97  Black 
and Boyd began the task of tackling this research in their 2012 study, 
finding evidence that a pool “clerk’s cert recommendation interacts with 
the quality of the [cert] petition and the comparative ideology of the 
voting Justice” to explain when Justices will agree with the pool clerk.98  
While their evidence was strong, the results were based on a relatively 
limited time frame (only four Terms) and a small sample of data (just 
over 300 petitions).  Our primary goal in this Article was to replicate 
and extend their study to see if the results held after examining a larger 
number of Court Terms and bigger set of petitions.  Importantly, the 
type of replication and extension exercise conducted here is encouraged 
in social science research.99  Indeed, renowned political science 
methodologist Gary King urges the replication of “existing studies to 
understand, evaluate, and especially build on” the previous work.100 
Our results largely confirm those found by Black and Boyd in their 
2012 paper.  To summarize, we find a substantial level of agreement 
between what law clerks recommend in the pool memos and how 
Justices ultimately vote.  Indeed, roughly 75% of the more than 9,500 
votes in our data follow the recommendation made by the law clerk.  
The influence of law clerks on Justices is neither constant nor random, 
however.  Rather, our analysis suggests that Justices compare the law 
clerk’s recommendation with their own prior belief about a petition’s 
certworthiness.101  Recommendations that are consistent with those 
beliefs are substantially more likely to be followed than those that 
challenge them.  Additionally, in the event that a pool clerk 
recommends granting review in a petition—an event that occurs about 
31% of the time in our data—a voting Justice also considers the 
 
97.  Black & Boyd, supra note 1, at 164. 
98.  Id.  
99.  See Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444 (1995). 
100.  Id. at 444. 
101.  See infra Appendix Table 2. 
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ideology of the clerk’s supervising Justice.  When a Justice is 
ideologically proximate to a clerk’s employing Justice, we find that the 
voting Justice is more than twice as likely to follow that 
recommendation than when the Justice is ideologically distant.  Taken 
together with the findings from our original study, these results provide 
strong evidence of the conditional influence that law clerks can have in 
the Court’s agenda-setting process.  These clerks are not just spending a 
lot of time reviewing cert petitions, something that we estimated above 
to be approximately one-third of their work load,102 but they are 
wielding potential influence on their own employing Justices and other 
Justices while doing so. 
B. Normative Implications for the Cert Pool 
Our present findings, coupled with those previously obtained by 
Black and Boyd, provide what may be very important normative 
implications of the existence of the institutionalized cert pool.  Recall 
that, from its inception in 1972, the cert pool implored law clerks to 
author “objective” memos.103  While our research confirms the 
standardization of the memos’ formatting, it paints a very different 
picture regarding the content of the memos, particularly with regard to 
the conclusions drawn.  As we summarize above, grant 
recommendations are treated differently when coming from a clerk who 
hails from an ideological ally as opposed to a foe.  This may not be 
surprising, especially given what we know about the strength of the 
principal–agent relationship between a Justice and his hired clerk. 
It does, however, call into question whether the cert pool was, just 
over a decade after its inception, serving its intended goals.  To the 
extent bias exists in the recommendations, a pool Justice needs to 
devote additional effort to detect and correct for that bias before she 
can cast her agenda-setting vote.  If this work is being delegated to a 
Justice’s law clerk, which seems very likely, then we must ask, how much 
of an efficiency gain is there over simply having one’s own law clerks do 
an independent review?  Interestingly, our results suggest that the 
answer to this question will depend upon the ideological composition of 
the Court and, in particular, a Justice’s location on the Court.  If a 
Justice is one of the more extreme members of the Court, then grant 
recommendations from either proximate or distant chambers are 
 
102.  See supra notes 22 and accompanying text.  
103.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 118. 
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informative—you follow those from allies and do the opposite of those 
coming from ideologically distant chambers.  Paradoxically, however, a 
Justice in the middle stands to gain far less from either end of the 
spectrum and, as a result, would likely need to invest more of her clerk’s 
time to determine what the most appropriate vote would be.  This newly 
revealed nuance thus opens the door for more empirical and normative 
scholarship assessing the value and efficiency of the cert pool for all 
participating members of the Court. 
C. Generalizing About Advisors Beyond the Supreme Court 
As we have already argued, the activities of law clerks during the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda-setting process provide an excellent 
setting for systematically and empirically testing for advisor influence.104  
Although we recognize that Supreme Court law clerks are not precisely 
analogous to advisors in the Executive and Legislative Branches of the 
federal government, we believe that in many ways, the similarities 
between these staffers outweigh the differences, particularly when 
examining the existence and conditionality of their influence.  These 
similarities range across the education and experience of the people that 
fill the jobs, the motivations that drive the employees, and the tasks that 
they are asked to perform while serving in their staff positions.105 
Law clerks are regarded as being among the brightest and most 
talented young legal minds.106  Modern clerks typically come from the 
top of their class at an elite law school and often have experience 
clerking for a federal trial or appellate judge.107  Similar language has 
also been used to describe congressional advisors.108  White House 
staffers, particularly those that serve close to the President, tend to be 
more experienced (and older) than congressional and court advisors, but 
the positions held by all three groups are highly coveted and can lead to 
uncountable future opportunities—both inside and outside of 
Washington.109 
In addition to similar backgrounds, key advisors to presidents, 
legislators, and Justices tend to be selected with many of the same 
 
104.  See Black & Boyd, supra note 1; see also supra Part II.B. 
105.  See supra Part III. 
106.  See WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 1. 
107.  Id. at 55. 
108.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: 
CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 20 (1979). 
109.  See id. at 21–23. 
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characteristics in mind.  Presidents generally choose only those who 
have demonstrated personal loyalty and trustworthiness to them and 
their partisan ideals to serve in close advisory positions.110  Although the 
criteria for choosing lower level White House staffers is less careful and 
precise, no one can serve the President without some demonstrated 
dedication to the office.111  Members of Congress, particularly in modern 
times with large staffs and a relatively high level of turnover, tend to 
have less of a hands-on role in the selection process of their staff.112  
Nonetheless, the content of “their personal staffs are entirely subject to 
their discretion,”113 and partisan dedication matters greatly for choosing 
these employees.114  As one anonymous member was quoted in 
Whiteman as saying of his staff, “I rely on their judgment, and I have to 
think that their judgment is attuned to my philosophy.”115  At the 
Supreme Court, the nine Justices choose new clerks each year.  
Although educational cues provide a bar for employment, other factors, 
including previous clerkship experience and ideological similarity or 
acquiescence, seem to be operational with at least some Justices.116 
In each institution, although advisors tackle critical tasks and 
arguably exert vast influence, they nearly uniformly do so out of sight.  
Their employers were the ones elected or appointed to their positions, 
and, as such, are the ones that serve in the public spotlight. Patterson, 
for example, notes that when it comes to presidential power “it is the 
men and women on the president’s personal staff who first channel that 
power, shape it, focus it—and, on the president’s instructions, help him 
wield it.  . . . [Most of them] are nearly unknown—largely because it is 
usually in the president’s interest to keep them out of sight.”117 
The same is said to be true for the other branches, with the 
anonymity of the job actually acting to foster a spirit of cooperation and 
 
110.  GARRISON, supra note 34, at 137. 
111.  Rudalevige, supra note 43, at 341.  
112.  See Salisbury & Shepsle, supra note 38, at 393–94. 
113.  David L. Leal & Fredrick M. Hess, Who Chooses Experience? Examining the Use 
of Veteran Staff by House Freshman, 36 POLITY 651, 655 (2004). 
114.  Romzek & Utter, supra note 11, at 1267.  
115.  WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 35–36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116.  WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 10, at 76, 102–03; Ditslear & Baum, supra note 49, 
at 870–71.  
117.  PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 1. 
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to reduce (but not eliminate entirely) incentives for shirking or self-
promotion.118 
We, of course, are not the first to argue that the role of law clerks is 
similar to that of other federal political advisors.  Fox and Hammond 
argue that “[t]he job of congressional aide, whether on a personal or 
committee staff, is a peculiarly personal one—based on mutual trust, 
confidence, and loyalty to a member.  Analogous jobs in the Federal 
government are the White House staff, personal assistants to 
Presidential appointees, and clerks of judges.”119  Although it is 
important to remember that our attempts to systematically test advisor 
influence focus only on one stage at one political institution, we also 
think that these efforts are nonetheless meritorious and provide insight 
into the broader topic of advisor influence in politics.  Although law 
clerks, legislative advisors, and presidential staffers are different in 
many ways, their similarities are salient enough to allow us to draw 
preliminary conclusions about the presence of advisor influence and the 
conditional nature of that influence across political branches based on 
our findings regarding clerk influence at the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Although future efforts are needed to generalize these findings across 
the other branches of government, we have little reason to doubt that 
advisor influence is any weaker for legislators and presidents—though it 
might be more difficult to measure and document.  As such, if taken 
seriously and studied rigorously, the question of advisor influence over 
political principals could lead to a more complete understanding of the 
factors that affect political decision making.  
 
118.  See Christine DeGregario, Research Note, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress: 
Committee Chairs and Senior Aides, 28 POLITY 261, 266 (1995); Romzek & Utter, supra note 
11, at 1268. 
119.  FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 8, at 3. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1 
Logistic Regression Parameter Estimates of Petition Certworthiness 
 
Variable Variable Coding 
Coefficient 
(Standard 
Error) 
Conflict Alleged Did petitioner allege existence of 
legal conflict?  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
Conflict Present Did pool memo determine that 
alleged legal conflict existed?  (0 = 
no, 1 = yes) 
2.65* 
(0.20) 
U.S. Seeks Review Was U.S. petitioner in case or did it 
submit an amicus brief seeking 
review?  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
1.89* 
(0.26) 
U.S. Opposes Review Was U.S. respondent in case or did 
it submit an amicus brief opposing 
review (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
Dissent in Lower Court Did one or more lower court judges 
dissent from majority opinion in 
court immediately below Supreme 
Court?  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
0.69* 
(0.20) 
Constitutional Petition Did petitioner assert a violation of 
his or her constitutional rights?  (0 = 
no, 1 = yes) 
-0.08 
(0.21) 
Judicial Review 
Exercised 
Did court immediately below 
Supreme Court exercise judicial 
review by invalidating a law as being 
unconstitutional?  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
1.34* 
(0.31) 
Legal Salience Did opinion of court immediately 
below the Supreme Court receive 
media coverage in the legal 
periodical U.S. Law Week?  (0 = no, 
1 = yes) 
0.35* 
(0.19) 
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Civil Liberties Petition Did petition involve a civil liberties 
issue?120  (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
-0.17 
(0.17) 
Total Amicus Curiae 
Briefs 
How many amicus briefs were filed 
either supporting or opposing the 
petition? 
0.36* 
(0.09) 
Constant  -2.08* 
(0.21) 
Observations  1100 
Pseudo-R2  0.31 
Note: The cell entries in the right column are maximum likelihood coefficients.  
Standard errors, which appear in parentheses below each coefficient, are robust 
standard errors.  
 
120.  See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
66, 74 (2000). 
 108 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:75 
Appendix Table 2 
Logistic Regression Parameter  
Estimates of Clerk–Justice Voting Agreement 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Clerk Recommendation -2.40 
(0.18) 
Certworthiness -2.93* 
(0.20) 
Ideological Distance -0.32* 
(0.15) 
Certworthy x Ideological 
Distance 
0.81* 
(0.37) 
Certworthy x Clerk 
Recommendation 
5.22* 
(0.33) 
Clerk Recommendation x 
Ideological Distance 
-1.15* 
(0.35) 
Certworthy x Recommendation x 
Distance 
-0.90 
(0.60) 
Justice Tenure -0.004 
(0.014) 
Justice Fixed Effects 
Justice Blackmun 2.50* 
(0.29) 
Justice Brennan 2.35* 
(0.45) 
Justice Ginsburg 3.19* 
(0.73) 
Justice Kennedy 2.47* 
(0.11) 
Justice Marshall 2.46* 
(0.32) 
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Justice O’Connor 2.28* 
(0.15) 
Justice Powell 2.50* 
(0.29) 
Justice Rehnquist 2.06* 
(0.11) 
Justice Scalia 2.39* 
(0.14) 
Justice Souter 2.46* 
(0.15) 
Justice Stevens 1.95* 
(0.21) 
Justice Thomas 2.59* 
(0.19) 
Justice White 1.53* 
(0.39) 
Observations 9531 
Pseudo-R2 0.11 
Note: The cell entries in the right column are maximum likelihood coefficients.  
Standard errors, which appear in parentheses below each coefficient, are robust 
standard errors.  Because our model contains numerous interactive terms, this table 
should not be used to assess either the statistical significance or substantive 
magnitude of any variable except Justice Tenure, which is not statistically 
significant.  See Figures 1 and 2 and the accompany text above for interpretation of 
these results.  Complete Justice Fixed Effects were estimated by suppressing the 
constant term, which means there is no baseline justice category.  See Figure 3 and 
accompanying text above for discussion of the substance of these results. 
